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AND THE CONGRESS SHALL HAVE POWER TO . . . : THE
IMPLICATIONS OF THE
D.C. CIRCUIT COURT’S PER CURIAM DECISION IN BAHLUL V.
UNITED STATES
Clarke D. Cotton*

I. INTRODUCTION
Today, Amagansett, New York is an attractive East Hampton
neighborhood.1 A get-away for the rich and powerful, there are typically
more vacationers than residents in the town at any given time.2 Among
the many mansions that populate Amagansett is a historic Coast Guard
station that sits just off Atlantic Avenue beach.3 In 1966 the station was
moved to a private residence to protect and preserve its features.4 In
2007, the station was moved back to its original spot off Atlantic
Avenue beach and, now, is protected as a historical landmark.5 This is
the station that Coast Guardsman John C. Cullen sprinted to in 1942 to
warn of a most extraordinary finding: a group of Nazis had landed on
American soil with explosives in hand, they were here to do our country
harm.6
Thirty-five miles outside of Berlin, Germany, laid a camp in which
eight Nazi soldiers were trained in the use of explosives, fuses, and
detonators.7 These men received their instruction from Lt. Walter
Kappe and focused on destroying railroads, factories, and other strategic
U.S. military and infrastructure targets.8 The eight soldiers were divided
into two groups. The first was led by Edward John Kerling, and included
Werner Thiel, Hermann Neubauer, and Herbert Hans Haupt.9 Kerling’s

* Associate Member, 2016-2017, University of Cincinnati Law Review
1. John Rather, If You’re Thinking of Living in Amagansett, L.I.; A Down to Earth Hamptons
Alternative, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/30/realestate/if-you-rethinking-living-amagansett-li-down-earth-hamptons-alternative.html.
2. Id.
3. Amagansett Life Saving Station (1902) East Hampton, New York, U.S. LIFE-SAVING SERVICE
HERITAGE ASSOCIATION, http://uslife-savingservice.org/station/endangered-stations/amagansett-lifesaving-station-1902-east-hampton-ny/.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Richard Goldstein, John Cullen, Coast Guardsman Who Detected Spies, Dies at 90, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/03/nyregion/john-cullen-coast-guardsmanwho-detected-spies-dies-at-90.html.
7. LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31340, MILITARY TRIBUNALS: THE QUIRIN
PRECEDENT 1 (2002).
8. Id. at 1.
9. Id. at 5.
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group headed for the coast of Florida, and they arrived near Jacksonville
without incident on June 16, 1942.10 The second group was led by
George John Dasch, and included Earnest Peter Burger, Heinrich Harm
Heinck, and Richard Quirin.11 Their group headed for New York City,
and they arrived on the beaches of Amagansett on June 12, 1942, in full
uniform and with explosives in tow.12
The night of June 12 was particularly foggy when Coastguardsman
Cullen began his beach patrol.13 Cullen, then twenty-one, had joined the
Coast Guard a few weeks after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.14
He was assigned to one of the least glamorous tasks a Coastguardsman,
or any U.S. serviceman, could be assigned: a “sand pounder.”15
Essentially, a sand pounder was responsible for walking up and down
the beach – pounding sand – and looking for signs of enemy submarines
or planes.16 The job was boring and lonely, and sand pounders did not
even carry weapons.17
Not long after his patrol began, Cullen happened upon Dasch’s group
digging in the sand.18 Dasch, whose English was quite good, explained
that he and his friends were fishermen who had run aground.19
However, one of the other men, dragging a large bag, shouted something
in German. Seeing Cullen’s suspicion, Dasch abandoned his fisherman
story and asked Cullen if he had parents who would grieve his death.20
“I wouldn’t want to have to kill you,” said Dasch.21
Instead, Dasch, perhaps considering the difficulties that murdering a
service member would cause, offered Cullen $300, asking, “Why don’t
you forget the whole thing?”22 Cullen quickly agreed, accepting the
money, which he later counted to be only $260, and retreated back into
the fog.23 However, once he was out of sight, Cullen sprinted back to the
Coast Guard station to inform his superiors of his discovery.24 Cullen
10. Id. at 5.
11. Id. at 5.
12. Id. at 5.
13. Aileen Jacobson, Nazi Saboteurs in the Amagansett Sands, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/14/nyregion/june-13-1942-saboteurs-land-in-amagansett-on-view-ineast-hampton.html?_r=0.
14. Goldstein, supra note 6.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Fisher, supra note 7, at 5; Jacobson, supra note 13.
19. Goldstein, supra note 6.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Fisher, supra note 7, at 5.
24. Jacobson, supra note 13.
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and the Coastguardsmen recovered the buried explosives and contacted
the FBI station in New York City, who then launched a massive
manhunt.25
The manhunt was short lived, however. On the night of June 14,
Dasch decided to turn himself in to the FBI.26 Dasch called the New
York headquarters, informed the desk agent that he was a Nazi, and told
of his plans.27 For reasons that remain unclear, the desk agent did not
appear to take these claims seriously.28 Dasch offered to travel to
Washington D.C. and turn himself into FBI Headquarters.29 The FBI
agent made a note of the phone call but never sent the memo to D.C. or
asked Dasch to turn himself in in the New York office. It appeared that
the agent was happy to take Dasch at his word, which luckily, Dasch
kept.30
As Dasch traveled to D.C., Kerling’s group arrived in Jacksonville,
unbeknownst to the FBI. From there, the four Nazis traveled to
Cincinnati, Ohio, staying a few days before splitting up.31 Two of the
men traveled to Chicago while the other two went to New York.32
Dasch arrived in D.C. on June 20, 1942, and turned himself in to
authorities.33 Burger, who at the time knew of Dasch’s plans, waited in
his hotel room and was arrested without incident.34 With the help of
Dasch and Burger, the FBI located and arrested the other six Nazis and,
by June 27, all eight saboteurs were in custody.35
Originally, the Nazis were to be tried in federal court, but Attorney
General Francis Biddle quickly discovered a problem: there were almost
no charges that could be brought against the Nazis.36 Of course, they
could be charged with sabotage, which carried a maximum 30-year
sentence, but they had not actually committed any acts of sabotage.37
Biddle, believing sabotage would not hold up at trial, limited the charges
to conspiracy, which carried a two-year sentence and a fine.38
Additionally, he might have been able to charge the men with a
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Fisher, supra note 7, at 2.
Id.
Jacobson, supra note 13.
Fisher, supra note 7, at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Jacobson, supra note 13.
Fisher, supra note 7, at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id .at 4.
Id.
Id.
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violation of immigration laws.39
As such, President Roosevelt commissioned a military tribunal to try
the eight Nazis.40 The military tribunal allowed the Government to seek
the death penalty. Additionally, the military tribunal could be held in
secret, which was another win for the government. FBI Director J. Edgar
Hoover used the media to create the false impression that the FBI used
their superior detective skills to apprehend the Nazis.41 In federal court,
the public would quickly learn of Coastguardsmen Cullen’s luck, the
New York office’s incompetence, and Dasch’s aid in apprehending the
Nazis.42 In military tribunal, the proceedings would be in secret,
allowing the FBI to control the narrative.
At the military trial, all eight Nazis were found guilty.43 The two
defectors were sentenced to prison and hard labor, while the remaining
six were sentenced to death by electrocution, which was carried out on
August 8, 1942.44 Eight days prior to the executions, the Supreme Court
issued a hasty per curiam decision ruling that the Military Commission
was constitutional.45 Two and a half months after the executions, the
Supreme Court supplemented their ruling in a long and confusing
decision.46
This decision—Ex Parte Quirin—opened the door to numerous
questions about the power of the President, the reach of Congress, the
constitutionality of military tribunals, the application of international
law, and the very definition of war itself. Quirin, a long and rambling
decision, left the door to interpretation wide open. It is through this door
that Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul wished to have his conviction
overturned.
The following Casenote addresses the Constitutional issues raised by
Bahlul following his conviction and sentencing by a military
commission. Part II provides background on the creation of military
commissions, on the defendant, Bahlul, and on the procedural posture of
Bahlul’s case. Part III addresses Bahlul’s challenge of the military
tribunals and the specific arguments presented by Bahlul and the
Government. Part IV provides a summary of the two concurrences and
the dissent in the D.C. Circuit Court’s per curiam opinion released in
October 2016. Part V, the Discussion section, addresses a hypothetical

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 3.
Jacobson, supra note 13.
See generally Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
Id.
Id.
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posed by the dissent, proposes a new test for examining these types of
cases, and applies this new test to the dissent’s hypothetical.
II. BACKGROUND
This section addresses the history leading up to Bahlul’s challenge,
including the actions of President George W. Bush and the United States
Congress. Additionally, this section provides a brief history of Bahlul
and the procedural posture of his challenges of the military tribunals.
A. Congress, the President, and the War on Terror
Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, President George
W. Bush exercised broad authority to detain enemy combatants in the
name of national security.47 President Bush’s decisions led to a
significant political divide, with his opponents claiming the President’s
actions were unconstitutional.48 Chief among the issues raised was the
power of the President, and later the power of Congress, to create
military tribunals to try suspected terrorists of war crimes.49
President Bush issued an Executive Order on November 13, 2001,
that allowed military tribunals to try non-American citizens accused of
participating in or conducting terrorist acts.50 The President’s authoirity
to commission military tribunals has long been a contentious and an
uncertain area of constitutional law.51 The use of military tribunals has
been traced back to both the Civil War and World War II.52 During the
Civil War, military tribunals were used by President Lincoln to
effectively and efficiently try Confederate soldiers.53 However, there
was no constitutional challenge raised during the Civil War. Conversely,
during World War II, this very issue was raised and litigated in Ex Parte
Quirin, the case involving the Nazi saboteurs.
As noted above, following the capture of the saboteurs, President
Roosevelt commissioned a Military Tribunal to try the men.54 They were
charged with the following crimes:

47. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 394 (5th ed.
2015).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 400.
51. Id. at 401.
52. Ali Hamza Ahmed Suliman Al Bahlul (Bahlul III) v. United States 840 F.3d 757, 759 (D.C.
Cir. 2016).
53. Id.
54. Chemerinsky, supra note 47, at 401.
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I. Violation of the law of war.
II. Violation of Article 81 of the Articles of War, defining the
offense of relieving or attempting to relieve, or corresponding with
or giving intelligence to, the enemy.
III. Violation of Article 82, defining the offense of spying.
IV. Conspiracy to commit the offenses alleged in charges [I, II, and
III].55
Procedurally, the Supreme Court issued a short per curiam opinion,
affirming the power and jurisdiction of the military tribunals.56 The men
were tried and convicted, and six were executed.57 Two and a half
months after the executions, the Supreme Court finally issued its full
opinion. In the decision, the Court stated, “[b]y universal agreement and
practice the law of war draws a distinction between…lawful and
unlawful combatants.”58 In defining this distinction, the Supreme Court
ruled that lawful combatants should be treated as prisoners of war,
entitled to the full protections of a prisoner of war, while unlawful
combatants were “offenders against the law of war subject to trial and
punishment by military tribunals.”59 Of special interest was the Court’s
decision not to define or decide the outer bounds of a military tribunal’s
jurisdiction.60 Instead, they seemed satisfied with the ruling that lawful
combatants were entitled to the laws of war while unlawful combatants
could be tried by military tribunal.
This obviously raises the difficult question of just how far the Quirin
decision should reach. The question is left open as to whether Quirin is
binding precedent or unique because, at the time, America was actually
involved in a war declared by Congress.
The issue of Quirin came to life again in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.61 In
November of 2001, Salim Ahmed Handan, of Yemen, was captured in
Afghanistan and later transferred to Guantanamo Bay.62 After a year in
detention, Hamdan was tried by a military commission for “conspiracy
to commit offenses connected with the attacks of September 11,
2001.”63 Hamdan subsequently petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus,
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.64
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 605 (2006).
Chemerinsky, supra note 47, at 410.
Id. at 401
Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1942).
Id. at 31; Chemerinsky, supra note 47, at 401.
Chemerinsky, supra note 47, at 401.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 604 (2006).
Id. at 566.
Id.
Id. at 567.
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In a 5-3 decision, Justice Stevens’ majority opinion found that “the
military tribunals were not authorized by act of Congress and that they
violated the Uniform code of Military Justice and the Geneva
Conventions.”65 Specifically, Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions requires that the accused by tried in a “regularly constituted
court.”66 As such, President Bush’s courts did not satisfy Common
Article 3, and the conviction was vacated.67 For Hamdan to be properly
tried, his hearing must occur before a “regularly constituted court
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples”68
In response to the Court’s decision, Congress enacted the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 (“MCA”), which “amended the statutory
procedures governing military commission to cure the flaws identified
in Hamdan.”69 Specifically, the Military Commissions Act enumerated
thirty war crimes triable by military commissions.70 Moreover, it
conferred jurisdiction on military commissions to try “any offense made
punishable by this chapter or the law of war when committed by an alien
unlawful enemy combatant before, on, or after September 11, 2001.”71
B. The Defendant, al Bahlul
Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul is a native of Yemen.72 At some
point in the late 1990s, Bahlul traveled to Afghanistan to join al
Qaeda.73 While in Afghanistan, Bahlul trained with al Qaeda, eventually
pledged a bayat (an oath of loyalty) to Osama bin Laden, and was
assigned to work in the al Qaeda media and propaganda department.74
Following the October 12, 2000, attack on the U.S.S. Cole, Bahlul
created a video glorifying the attack to use as a recruitment tool.75 The
video called for a jihad against America and blamed the West for
Muslim problems in the East.76 The video was considered a successful
recruitment tool and has been translated into several languages in an

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Chemerinsky, supra note 47, at 402.
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 631-32.
Id.
Id.
Bahlul v. United States (Bahlul I), 767 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
Id.
Id.at 6-7.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6.
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attempt to expand al Qaeda recruitment.77
Given the success of the video, Bahlul was promoted and became Bin
Laden’s personal assistant and secretary of public relations.78 In this
capacity, Bahlul arranged for the bayat and “martyr wills” of Mohamed
Atta and Ziad al Jarrah, two of the 9/11 hijackers.79 Bahlul proudly
proclaimed that he volunteered to participate in the 9/11 attacks himself,
but was turned down by bin Laden because of his importance to the al
Qaeda organization.80
Prior to the 9/11 attacks, Bahlul and bin Laden fled to a remote
location in Afghanistan to await the results of their planned attack.81 In
the weeks following 9/11, Bahlul again fled, this time to Pakistan where
he was captured in December 2001 and turned over to U.S. Military
forces.82 Bahlul was transferred to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where he
was held as an enemy combatant pursuant to the 2001 Authorization for
Use of Military Force.83 Bahlul was eventually charged with three
crimes under the 2006 Military Commissions Act: (1) conspiracy to
commit war crimes, (2) providing material support for terrorism, and (3)
solicitation of others to commit war crimes.84 Specifically, “the
conspiracy and solicitation charges allege seven object crimes
proscribed by the 2006 MCA: murder of protected persons, attacking
civilians, attacking civilian objects, murder in violation of the law of
war, destruction of property in violation of the law of war, terrorism,
and providing material support for terrorism.”85
C. Procedural Posture
The path to Bahlul’s conviction is long and convoluted. But a
summary of the procedural posture is appropriate. Bahlul was originally
charged under President Bush’s military tribunals. However, Bahlul’s
prosecution was stayed, awaiting a decision from the Supreme Court in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan and Congress’
enactment of the MCA, Bahlul’s charges were amended, and he
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 7.
85. See generally Samantha Sliney, U.S. v. Al Bahlul: Where It’s Been and Where It’s Going,
Harvard Law School National Security Journal (March 22, 2016) (discussing the proceedings leading up
to the decision of October 2016).
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appeared before a military commission.86 A military commission
convicted Bahlul of the three crimes listed above and sentenced him to
life in prison.87 His conviction was reviewed by the United States Court
of Military Commission Review (“CMCR”) and the conviction was
upheld.88
Following the decision of the Military Commission Review, Bahlul
appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court (“Bahlul I”).89 In their first decision,
the D.C. Circuit Court vacated Bahlul’s conviction based upon
Hamdan.90 The government was granted a rehearing en banc and the
court then affirmed Bahlul’s conspiracy conviction, vacating the other
convictions, and remanding the remaining decision (“Bahlul II”).91
On remand in Bahlul II, Bahlul’s conspiracy conviction was once
again vacated with the court holding that “conviction of Bahlul for
inchoate conspiracy by law of war military commission violated
separation of powers enshrined in Article III.”92 The Government once
again requested a hearing en banc and ultimately vacated the decision
that vacated the conspiracy charge and scheduled another hearing
(“Bahlul III”).93
III. BAHLUL’S CHALLENGE
After vacating the June 2015 decision, the Bahlul III court requested
that the sides address two questions: the proper standard of review and
“whether the Define and Punish Clause of the Article I of the
Constitution gives Congress power to define as an offense against the
law of nations, triable before a law-of-war military commission, a
conspiracy to commit an offense against the law of nations, to wit, a
conspiracy to commit war crimes; and whether the exercise of such
power transgresses Article III of the Constitution.”94
Of importance to this decision are the Define and Punish Clause, the
Declare War Clause, and the Necessary and Proper Clause. The Define
and Punish Clause reads, “[The Congress shall have the Power] . . . To
86. Id.
87. Bahlul v. United States (Bahlul I), 767 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
88. Id.
89. Sliney, supra note 85.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Bahlul v. United States (Bahlul II), No. 11-1324, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 16967, at *1 (D.C.
Cir. Sept. 25, 2015); While the D.C. Circuit Court did propose two specific questions, the first question
remains outside the scope of this article. All of the Judges except for one, Judge Millet, agreed that the
standard was de novo.
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define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the High Seas,
and Offenses against the Law of Nations.”95 The Declare War Clause
reads, “[The Congress shall have the Power] . . . To declare War, grant
Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on
Land and Water.”96 Finally, the Necessary and Proper Clause reads,
“[The Congress shall have the Power] . . . To make all Laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof.”97
All parties to the litigation agreed, the United States established
military commissions in three wartime situations: (1) to operate as
general courts in areas under martial law; (2) as general courts in the
areas that the military temporarily occupies; and (3) to punish enemy
belligerents who commit offenses against the laws of war during an
armed conflict.98 Additionally, all parties agreed that Bahlul’s trial
occurred under the third type of military commission.99 However, their
disagreement occurred in the scope of that military commission’s
jurisdiction.
A. The Government’s Argument
The Government argued that international laws of war did not act as a
constraint upon their authority to charge and convict prisoners of war.100
In support of this position, the Government argued that it was within
Congress’s authority to “authorize military commissions to try enemy
belligerents for violations of the international laws of war as well as any
other offenses Congress defines as violations of the ‘laws of war.’”101
Essentially, the Government’s argument was that military commissions
had the power to try international law of war offenses and Congress had
the power to create separate and distinct causes of action for military
commissions.
In the alternative, the Government argued that a military commission
might try an enemy belligerent for international law of war offenses, as
well as “any offenses punishable under a ‘U.S. common law of war.’”102
95.
96.
97.
98.
Cir. 2016)
99.
100.
101.
102.

U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 10.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
Ali Hamza Ahmed Suliman Al Bahlul (Bahlul III) v. United States, 840 F.3d 757,759 (D.C.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss2/9

10

Cotton: And the Congress Shall Have Power To...: The Implications of the

2018]

IMPLICATIONS OF BAHLUL V. UNITED STATES

807

Though this assertion, the Government contended that military
commissions had the power to try offenses listed in international laws of
war and offenses that have been historically recognized at triable by
military commissions, for which conspiracy would qualify. Specifically,
the Government pointed to a case that was a main contention of this
litigation: Ex Parte Quirin as well as some other historical analysis.103
B. Bahlul’s Argument
Bahlul argued that the military commissions were only able to try
offenses against the international laws of war.104 The challenged
conviction—conspiracy—was not listed as an international law of war
offense. In support of this argument, Bahlul relied heavily on the
Hamdan decision.
Additionally, Bahlul argued that acts created under the Define and
Punish Clause were limited by international law.105 Specifically, Bahlul
argued that “law of nations” was synonymous “international law” and,
therefore, international law acted as a constraint upon the Define and
Punish Clause.106
III. BAHLUL III
A. Kavanagh Concurrence
The first concurrence, joined by Judges Henderson, Brown, Griffith,
and Kavanagh would have upheld the conspiracy conviction as an
offense triable by the military commission. In reaching this decision, the
Kavanagh concurrence relied on historical standards: Congress twice
passed the Military Commission Act, and both Presidents Bush and
Obama signed the Military Commission Acts into law.107
First, this concurrence addressed Bahlul’s argument that his
conviction violated Articles I and III of the Constitution in that the
military commissions could only try offenses written under international
law.108 The concurrence began by calling this argument “extraordinary”
because it “would incorporate international law into the U.S.
Constitution as a judicially enforceable constrain on Congress and the

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 761.
Id. at 761.
Id. at 774.
Id. at 760.
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President.”109 Essentially, the Kavanagh concurrence characterized
Bahlul’s argument as attempting to enforce international law, that is not
necessarily agreed upon through a treaty, on American military
tribunals.110
Kavanagh addressed the Article I issue first. Bahlul conceded that
Congress does have the power to establish military commissions,
however, he argued that these powers were limited only to offenses
defined by international laws of war.111 Kavanagh pointed to five
sources of law to support Congress’ authority to create military
commissions and to define the offenses that they may try: (1) the text
and original understanding of Article I, (2) the overall structure of the
Constitution, (3) landmark Supreme Court precedent, (4) longstanding
federal statutes, and (5) deeply rooted U.S. military commission
practice.112
In regard to the text and original understanding of Article I, Kavanagh
asserted that the Define and Punish Clause, the Declare War Clause, and
the Necessary and Proper Clause all worked together to give Congress
the authority it needed.113 As noted above, the Define and Punish Clause
gives Congress the power to “define and punish . . . Offenses against the
Law of Nations.”114 Bahlul argued that “law of nations” was
synonymous with “international law.”115 However, Kavanagh did not
find this argument persuasive, stating “the premise of Bahlul’s Article I
argument is flawed” because Article I authority is not found exclusively
in the Define and Punish Clause.116
Rather, Kavanagh found that the Declare War Clause “is understood
by universal agreement and practice to encompass all of the traditional
incidents of war – including the power to kill, capture and detain enemy
combatants, and most relevant here, the power to try unlawful enemy
combatants by military commission for unlawful war crimes.”117
Because there is sufficient power found within the Declare War Clause,
Kavanagh did not reach the issue of the scope of the Define and Punish
Clause.118
Second, Kavanagh addressed the structure and scope of the
109. Id. at 759.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 760.
112. Id. at 760.
113. Id. at 161.
114. Bahlul v. United States (Bahlul II), No. 11-1324, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 16967, at *1 (D.C.
Cir. Sept. 25, 2015).
115. Bahlul III, 840 F.3d at 761.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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Constitution itself. He stated, “[t]he Framers assigned the national
government – in particular, Congress and the President – the authority –
to make wartime decisions on behalf of the United States.”119 Kavanagh
continued, “it would be a historical anomaly to conclude that ‘We the
People of the United States’ gave foreign or international bodies the
power to constrain U.S. war-making authority in that way.”120
Turning now to the fourth reason, longstanding federal statutes,
Kavanagh emphasized that “[b]eginning in 1776, the Continental
Congress codified the offense of spying – a non-international-law of war
offense – as a crime triable by military tribunal . . . [l]ikewise in
September 1776, Congress authorized trial by military tribunal for
another non-international-law offense: aiding the enemy.”121
The third and fifth points, however, are where contention between the
Kavanagh concurrence and the joint dissent arose. In regards to
Supreme Court precedent, the Kavanagh concurrence cited primarily to
Ex Parte Quirin.122 Specifically, the Kavanagh concurrence pointed to
the fact that the Nazi saboteurs were tried and convicted of spying,
which was not and has never been an international law of war offense.123
However, the Kavanagh concurrence then focused on what the Quirin
court did not say, rather than what they did say.124 Specifically, they
pointed out that Quirin “did not say that military commissions are
constitutionally permitted only for international law of war offenses.
Nor did any later Supreme Court case hold that military commissions
are constitutionally permitted only for international law of war offenses.
One would have expected the Court at some point to say as much if the
Court actually thought as much.”125 Essentially, the Kavanagh
concurrence held that because the Quirin Court did not specifically state
that international law was a constraint upon military commissions, it
must not be.
B. Wilkins Concurrence
Circuit Judge Wilkins wrote separately with a rather novel theory of
this case. Essentially, Judge Wilkins found that Bahlul was not actually
convicted of inchoate conspiracy but was, in fact, “convicted of an
offense tantamount to substantive war crimes under a Pinkerton theory
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 762.
Id.
Id. at 765.
Id. at 763.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 763-64.
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of liability.”126 Wilkins found that international law recognized and
applied a Pinkerton theory of liability with which Bahlul’s conspiracy
comports. In fact, Judge Wilkins stated that if the separation of powers
issue was presented in this case, he would be inclined to side with the
dissent; however, he does not find a separation of powers issue at all.127
First, Judge Wilkins defined inchoate conspiracy as “the darling of
the modern prosecutor’s nursery” and that at its essence, conspiracy was
“an agreement to commit an unlawful act.”128 The agreement itself
satisfies the actus reas, and it is not necessary that the conspiracy
actually succeed for the conviction to succeed.129 Moreover, many
jurisdictions require “an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy but
the overt act itself does not have to be unlawful.”130 As a stand-alone
crime against the United States, conspiracy requires, “an agreement by
two or more persons to commit an offense. The defendant must
deliberately join the conspiracy with knowledge of this purpose. And
one of the conspiracy members must, at some point during its existence,
perform an overt act to further or advance the purpose of the
agreement.”131
In the alternative, under Pinkerton liability, a member to a conspiracy
can be held liable for reasonable foreseeable crimes committed by others
that are a part of the conspiracy.132 Under “a Pinkerton theory, a
defendant’s responsibility to the underlying offense generally requires
that the substantive offense be reasonably foreseeable and committed in
furtherance of the conspiracy’s objectives, all while the defendant was a
member of the conspiracy.”133 Essentially, the Wilkin’s concurrence
would likely agree that inchoate conspiracy is far too broad to be tried
by a military commission. However, Bahlul’s conviction much more
closely resembled a Pinkerton conspiracy charge which has been
recognized in international law.134
First, Judge Wilkins pointed out that the MCA’s version of
conspiracy very well may not reach the level of inchoate conspiracy.
Judge Wilkins stated, “the statute specifically references victims,
containing two sentencing variations depending on whether anybody
dies as a result of the conspiracy . . . In other words, by conditioning
punishment on either death or other harm befalling another person, the
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 798.
Id. at 800.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 801.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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MCA’s version of conspiracy contemplates the completion of a
substantive offense.”135 The major distinction between inchoate
conspiracy and a Pinkerton theory of liability is that inchoate conspiracy
is achieved “even though the substantive offense is not successfully
consummated.”136 Notably, there is a substantive offense completed in
this case: the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.137
Inchoate conspiracy jury instructions normally state that “the acts of
co-conspirators can be considered proof of the conspiracy charge against
the defendant.”138 However, this instruction or any similar instruction
was not given in Bahlul’s military tribunal.139 In fact, the conspiracy
instruction that was given in Bahlul’s trial required that the commission
find that Bahlul “knowingly committed at least one of the following
overt acts for the purpose of bringing about one of the objects of the
agreement.”140 Judge Wilkins continued by explaining that Bahlul was
on trial for ten specific findings regarding his own individual actions,
not merely his membership in Al Qaeda.141
Judge Wilkins opined, and Bahlul conceded, that the Pinkerton theory
of liability did not violate the Constitution and that it was a recognized
theory of vicarious liability in international law.142 In international law,
this is called Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE), and it occurs when there is
a “common purpose to commit a crime where one of the perpetrators
commits an act which, while outside the common purpose, is
nevertheless a natural and foreseeable consequence of the effecting of
the common purpose.”143 In fact, international tribunals have compared
Joint Criminal Enterprise to the Pinkerton theory of conspiracy.144
Specifically, one court stated, “[t]he standard itself for JCE III stems
from the Pinkerton v. United States doctrine . . . . Indeed, even the
language in Tadic is borrowed, from Pinkerton.”145
Therefore, Judge Wilkins’s theory of the case was that Bahlul’s
conviction must stand because he was convicted under a Pinkerton
theory of conspiracy. Since this particular type of conspiracy is
recognized in international law, there is no restrain on the conviction. It
is important to note, however, that Judge Wilkins stated that he would
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 802.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 803.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 803-04.
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have likely agreed with the dissent if Bahlul was in fact convicted of
inchoate conspiracy.
C. The Joint Dissent
The joint dissent is divided into four parts. First, the joint dissent
concurred in the de novo review of Bahlul’s case.146 Second, it
addressed why the government’s argument fell short.147 Third, it
addressed and countered particular arguments of the three
concurrences.148 And fourth, the joint dissent addressed potential
consequences of finding for the government.149
Beginning with Part II of the opinion, the dissent addressed the
Congressional ability to create limited exceptions to Article III courts,
including the creation of military commissions.150 The dissent
recognized three instances in which military commissions may be
established: (1) to operate as general courts during martial law; (2) to
operate as courts in areas in which the military currently occupies: and
(3) to “punish enemy belligerents who commit offenses against the laws
of war during an armed conflict.”151 The basis of the dissents argument
is that the Congress’ creation of stand-alone offenses, including
conspiracy, was unconstitutional under Article III.152
Quickly summarized, the dissent’s position is that there are limited
exceptions to Article III courts. One of those exceptions is for trying
enemy belligerents who commit offenses against the laws of war but,
under Quirin, this exception should be read narrowly to include only
international law of war offenses.153 Since conspiracy is not an
international law of war offense, Congress’s enactment of the offense is
an unconstitutional infringement upon Article III.154
In its interpretation of Quirin, the dissent asserted the Supreme Court
found that “law of war” referred to “branch of international law,” and,
therefore, the Quirin decision was based upon the Nazis’ violation of
international law of war offenses.155 Therefore, the question in Quirin
for the Supreme Court was whether or not the Nazis had “been charged

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 805.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 809.
Id. at 810.
Id.
See generally, id. at Part II.
Id.
Id. at 811.
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with a violation of the international rules governing armed conflicts.”156
The dissent argued that the Court’s question was limited to this, and that
the Supreme Court had decided that the actions of the Nazis constituted
a violation of international law. Specifically, the dissent provided:
Stating that the term “law of war” refers to a “branch of
international law” the Court proceeded to consider whether the
defendants had been charged with a violation of the international
rules governing armed conflicts. [The Court] ultimately concluded
that [the Nazis] had been, expressing its belief that passing behind
enemy lines in civilian dress with the purpose of committing
hostile acts was then an offense under international law.157
To further support this theory, the joint dissent cited In re Yamashia
and Johnson v. Eisentrager. Both Yamashita and Eisentrager cited
Quirin and in these decisions, the Supreme Court looked to international
law to determine whether the charges violated the “law of war” or
rather, “international law.” Specifically, Yamashita affirmed Quirin’s
“governing principles.”158 Because the joint dissent determined that
Quirin allowed only a limited exception to Article III courts, i.e., the
exception in international law, and because conspiracy is not an
international law of war offense, the conviction cannot stand.
Moreover, the dissent did not find persuasive the Government’s
argument that because conspiracy was not an international law of war
offense at the time Quirin was decided, Quirin stands for the principle
that Congress can enact defenses outside of international law.159 The
dissent found that the Quirin court must have believed, albeit
mistakenly, that conspiracy was an international law of war offense.
Next, the dissent addressed the government’s argument that “Article
III must be construed in light of Congress’s Article I powers and that
those powers enable Congress to go beyond international law in
determining the offenses triable by military commission.”160
Essentially, the Government argued that Quirin and its progeny
demonstrate that Congress derives its power to create military
commission from the war powers.161 Therefore, the Government argued
that Congress must also derive its power to list the offenses from the
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. While if Yamashita certainly reaffirms Quirin, the issue in this case, and in this Casenote is:
what are Quirin’s “governing principles”? Essentially, this argument could be used in support of either
argument, depending on what one believes the governing principles are.
159. Bahlul III, 840 F.3d at 823.
160. Id. at 818.
161. Id.
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War Powers Clause.162
In contrast, the dissent opined that Quirin and its progeny only
established Congress’s ability create military commissions. The
jurisdiction which those commissions may exercise, however, is still
limited by international law.
Additionally, the dissent employed what is essentially a slippery slope
argument, that if the conspiracy charge were allowed then there is no
telling what else could be allowed next.163 The dissent pointed out that
the Kavanagh concurrence would only allow for two constitutional
constraints upon military commissions: “(1) that the individuals are
‘enemy belligerents’ who (2) engaged in proscribed conduct ‘in the
context of and associated with hostilities.’”164 The dissent continued:
Critically, the government’s suggestion that the defendant’s status
as an enemy belligerent in the context of hostilities suffices to
subject him to trial by military commission ignores the Supreme
Court’s focus on the offenses triable to law-of-war military
commissions, in addition to the status of the offenders. Thus, the
Court has focused on “the question whether it is within the
constitutional power of the national government to place
petitioners upon trial before a military commission for the offenses
with which they are charged.” In Quirin, the Court “assume[d] that
there are acts” that could not be tried by military commission
“because they are of the class of offenses constitutionally triable
only by a jury.”165
Thus, the dissent is concerned that focusing on the status of the
offender, rather than the offense itself leads to ambiguities concerning
how these cases will be handled in the future.
V. DISCUSSION
Ultimately, the Bahlul per curiam encompassed four opinions, of
which only the dissent decided the original issue regarding whether the
Define and Punish Clause gives Congress the power to grant jurisdiction
to military tribunals to hear the conspiracy charges, which the dissent
answered in the negative. Both the Kavanagh concurrence and the joint
dissent took hard-line positions, with little room for compromise.
Kavanagh was concerned that overturning the conviction would
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id. at 835.
Id.
Id. at 835-36.
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constrict Congress, and therefore the people Congress represents, to the
mandates of international law. In Kavanagh’s view, the court does not
even need to reach the extent of the Define and Punish Clause, because
the Declare War Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause are
enough to provide Congress with the requisite authority.
In the alternative, Judge Rodgers’s dissent focused on the liberty and
due process issues that would arise by finding for the government. The
joint dissent posed the following hypothetical:
Suppose, for instance, that the FBI launches an investigation into
three lawful permanent residents who have lived in the United
States since early childhood. Searching an apartment in Virginia
that the three share, it discovers pipe bombs, al Qaeda propaganda,
and a map of the Washington, D.C., metro system. The
government arrests the three and wishes to prosecute them for
conspiracy to kill innocent civilians. Under the government’s view
of things, the Constitution would pose no bar to transferring the
individuals into military custody and prosecuting them before a
military commission.166
Thus, if the analysis is limited to Kavanagh and Rodgers, the choices
are rather stark and positional. Either we abdicate our Congressional
decision-making powers to international law or we open ourselves to a
world in which Congress has nearly unfettered power to try anyone as
an enemy belligerent as long as they can be tied to the War on Terror.
However, the choices need not be so grim. The possibility exists to
satisfy the interests of the Government in utilizing Military
Commissions while also guarding against the overreach that the dissent
fears. First, the Discussion Section of this Casenote addresses the scope
of the Define and Punish Clause. Next, this section addresses the
dissent’s hypothetical, as if that hypothetical were to be decided under
Kavanagh’s concurrence. Third, the Discussion Section will propose a
new test for analyzing these issues. Finally, the Discussion section
analyzes the dissent’s hypothetical once again; however, this time it will
be analyzed under the proposed test.
A. The Scope of the Define and Punish Clause
The Military Commissions Act derives its authority from the Define
and Punish Clause. The Define and Punish Clause has not been
specifically addressed by the Supreme Court. Lower courts have found
166. Id. at 836-37.
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that international law acts as a constraint upon the Define and Punish
Clause because the act of “defining” implies that the charge must
already have been created.167 Thus, in their opinions, Congress can only
“define” laws that are already a part of the “law of nations” or, in their
opinion, “international law.”
These courts do have a point: the power to define does not constitute
the power to create. By its very definition, to define something is to
provide a “statement of exact meaning” of something that is already in
existence.168 In this, the lower courts are correct: Congress does not have
the power to “create” offenses, only to define offenses and the
appropriate punishments.
However, where the courts are incorrect is in their interpretation of
“Law of Nations.” If there is any international constraint upon Congress,
it should only be on what they are restricted from doing. For example, if
the United States entered into a treaty by which it was agreed that a
conspiracy charge would violate international law of war principles,
then Congress may be restricted. As the Kavanagh concurrence points
out, it would be a historical anomaly to allow international law to act as
a constraint upon the Congress and the President in making war-time
decisions.
Indeed, it would be rather ironic for the American People to fight the
Revolutionary War, in large part because of a lack of representation
from a far-off government, only to later concede to those governments
the extent of power military commissions.
If Congress can only “define” international laws, Congress could
simply give every international law of war offense a definition so broad
as to allow it to force anyone into a Military Tribunal. Additionally, at
the time of the ratification of the Constitution, America was a small
country with limited power in the international community, it is unlikely
that the Framers intended to restrict Congress for years to come, based
upon the decisions of the international community.
B. The Dissent’s Hypothetical Under the Kavanagh Concurrence
The Kavanagh concurrence is so broad that any person could be
forced into a military tribunal so long as they are: (1) an enemy
belligerent and (2) they are engaged in proscribed conduct “in the
context of and associated with hostilities.” In fact, the Government
admitted as much during oral arguments. Under this interpretation, the
dissent has a strong argument that a non-citizen resident could be forced

167. Id. at 819-20.
168. Define, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2016).
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into a military commission.
Historically, non-citizen residents are afforded protections under the
Constitution.169 However, the broad interpretation of the Kavanagh
concurrence would appear to limit those rights. Utilizing the dissent’s
hypothetical, the three non-citizen lawful residents could be dragged
into a military commission by only this minimum standard. The fact that
the men were apparently involved with al Qaeda could fit them into the
broad definition of “enemy belligerent.” Moreover, the evidence of pipe
bombs and a map of Washington D.C. shows an “association with”
hostilities.
C. The Courts should employ a new test for analyzing these charges.
The issues raised by the scope of the jurisdiction of the Military
Commissions Act forces us to rethink how we should go about
answering these tough questions. The War on Terror is far from over
and it is impossible to predict future conflicts. Therefore, we must either
accept the overarching power of military commissions or constrain them
within the confines of international law. However, there may be another
way. This section proposes a new test for analyzing both the charges and
the people brought before military tribunals. The goal of this test is to
respect the precedent of Quirin and its progeny; to allow Congress to
create charges for military commissions with only limited restrictions
from international law; and to ensure protection from violations of due
process as feared by the dissent. This new test consists of four parts,
each of which is addressed below.
1. Is the charge brought by the military tribunal based upon an Act of
Congress? If so, is the particular charge listed in the Act?
Step One in this analysis is a simple cursory question that addresses
the problem raised in Hamdan. Essentially, this step asks whether
Congress has enacted a statute that would allow for the charges to be
brought. If there is no statute, any conviction should be vacated and an
analysis similar to the Supreme Court’s in Hamdan should begin.
However, if there is an act of Congress, this step is not asking
whether that Act is constitutional in and of itself. As with any Act of
Congress, it might satisfy one test, but then be found unconstitutional
under another. Additionally, this test asks whether or not the particular
charge is enumerated in the Act. While this may seem obvious, it simply
reinforces the fact that Congress must speak and do so with specificity.
169. See generally United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
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Under no circumstances should a military commission be authorized to
create its own charges or act in complete independence of Congress. The
parameters of the law and charges should be clearly defined. If there is
an identifiable statute, and the charge in question is enumerated therein,
the analysis should proceed to Step Two.
2. Is there a Constitutional Constraint upon the Charge, Conviction, or
Jurisdiction?
The second step of this analysis is meant to address the concerns of
the dissent; specifically, the concern was about placing non-citizen
residents or possibly even American citizens before a military tribunal if
they pledge loyalty to a terrorist organization. The concern about
dragging an American citizen into a military court has been addressed
and resolved by the Supreme Court.170 It is well settled that American
citizens, captured here or abroad, must be afforded due process of
law.171
However, the dissent raises an interesting question concerning noncitizen residents. Under Kavanagh’s broad interpretation of
Congressional power, it is quite possible that a non-citizen resident
could be forced into military court if they were determined to be an
enemy belligerent. However, adding a due process analysis resolves this
issue. It has long been settled that non-residents living in the United
States are afforded Constitutional rights and due process protections.172
By adding this additional due process consideration, citizens and noncitizen residents are distinguished and protected. If there is a
constitutional constraint, the analysis should stop and the conviction
vacated. If there is no constitutional constraint, the analysis continues to
Step Three.
3. Is this particular charge or offense enumerated in international law of
war or was the charge treated as an international law of war offense?
The third step of this analysis follows the reasoning of Judge
Wilkins’s concurrence. Although a specific offense may not be listed as
an international law of war offense, it may very well fall within a
broader definition of similar international law.
As cited by the Kavanagh concurrence, the Supreme Court case
United States v. Arjona, looked to international law for guidance, but did

170. See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
171. See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
172. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 665.
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not treat it as binding.173 Therefore, the courts should look for guidance
from international law, but should not treat is as a means of binding
Congress’s hands. A charge that can be found in international law serves
to strengthen the government’s argument, but it is not dispositive. If a
similar charge is found in international law, the analysis should stop and
the conviction should be upheld. However, if there is not similar charge,
the analysis continues to Step Four.
4. Does International Law act as a constraint upon the charge?
The final step of this analysis requires the court to look to
international law for specific restraints upon the charge or conviction, if
any exist. It important to note that this analysis does not look to
international law for permission, but rather for a restraint. In other
words, courts should analyze whether there is a treaty or international
agreement that would prevent the charge or conviction.
For example, if the Geneva Conventions or other lawfully enacted
treaties provide for a specific prohibition on the charge, Congress should
be prevented from creating it. Hypothetically, if the United States
entered into a treaty with another country wherein conspiracy was
strictly prohibited as a military court offense, the statute or charge
should be struck down or vacated.
D. The Dissent’s Hypothetical Under the New Test
Returning now to the hypothetical proposed by the dissent, this new
test will allow Congress and the military commission to exercise its
power without infringing upon due process. As quoted above, this
hypothetical involves three non-citizen residents who are arrested with
pipe bombs, al Qaeda propaganda, and a map of Washington D.C.
Assume that they are placed under the authority of a military tribunal,
tried, and convicted. They appeal their decision to the military
commission board, and their convictions are upheld. At this point they
exercise their right under the MCA to appeal the D.C. Circuit Court.
First, the court should determine whether or not there is an Act of
Congress under which the defendants were charged. In this case, that
would be the Military Commissions Act. As a part of this analysis, the
court should also inquire whether the defendants were charged with a
charge enumerated in the Act. Presumably they would be charged with
conspiracy. Assuming the charge is enumerated in the Act, the analysis
would advance to the next step.
173. See generally United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479 (1887).
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Second, the court should ask whether there is a constitutional
constraint upon charging these particular defendants. In this case, the
defendants would argue—and the court should give great weight—the
fact that they are non-citizen residents and are therefore protected by the
Constitution and deserving of a trial by jury in an Article III court.
However, this must be a heavy facts-and-circumstances analysis. If, for
example, the non-citizen residents defected to a Middle Eastern country
controlled by a terrorist organization for a period of time, received
training, and then reentered the United States illegally, they may very
well have forfeited their right to be heard in an Article III court.
Alternatively, if they traveled to a Middle Eastern country for a short
period before returning as a legal non-resident, they should still receive
protection from the constitution and access to an Article III court.
Recall the issue in Quirin, where eight Nazis entered the country
illegally intending to do harm. In that instance, the Nazis were not
legally allowed in the country and therefore did not avail themselves of
the protections of an Article III court. Now imagine that the Nazis were
legal non-residents who left America, received training in Germany, and
then returned to America as legal non-residents. This case is somewhat
more difficult, but the Nazis ultimately should still be afforded the right
to be heard in an Article III court. The decision in this part of the
analysis rests upon the defendants’ status at the time of the offense. If
they were a legal non-resident at that time, they are afforded greater due
process. However, if they were not a legal resident at the time of the
offense, and they meet the criteria of being an enemy belligerent, the
Government has the power to move the defendants into a military
commission.
Third, the court should ask if the charge can be found in international
law. Here, the court should utilize a Wilkins analysis. If the defendants
were charged with conspiracy and the burden of proof met by the
government meets a Pinkerton theory of liability, the court should
uphold the charge. Overall, the court should give deference to Congress
and their ability to create charges and convict enemy belligerents. If the
charge, or a similar charge, is not found in international law, Congress
should not be totally restricted from creating the charge. However, the
burden on the Government should be higher at this juncture.
This is the great novelty of Judge Wilkins’s opinion. Judge Wilkins,
rather than taking the defendant at his word, chose to fully analyze the
actual charge leveled against the defendant and the standard for applying
it. Given the limited facts of the dissent’s hypothetical, it appears the
Government would not win on a charge of Pinkerton conspiracy. For
Pinkerton conspiracy, there must be a completed act; here there is no
completed act. Bahlul committed multiple acts in furtherance of the
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conspiracy, to include traveling to Afghanistan to join al Qaeda, joining
al Qaeda, pledging loyalty to al Qaeda, leading others to pledge loyalty
to al Qaeda, acting as bin Laden’s personal secretary, preparing
propaganda for al Qaeda, etc.174
So assuming the actions of the three conspirators do not meet the
definition of Pinkerton conspiracy, an inchoate conspiracy is not
recognized by international law. This should not end the analysis. While
it is certainly advantageous to find a similar law in the international
community, it should not constrain Congress. However, if there is no
similar charge in international law, the burden on the Government
should be higher, especially in regards to the due process analysis and
step four. Ultimately, the only constraint upon Congress should be what
they cannot do, not what they can do.
Finally, the court should look for any constraints by international law
that would prevent the charge, conviction, or sentence. Specifically, the
court should look to the Geneva and Hague Conventions to determine if
international law prevents the charge. So long as there is no clearly
defined prevention of the charge, Congress should have the power,
under the Define and Punish Clause, to enumerate and enact the charges
so long as due process is satisfied. In the dissent’s hypothetical, we do
not know the specific charges levied against the defendants. Assuming
that there is not international restriction, however, the charges should be
upheld.
Under the dissent’s hypothetical, the convictions would potentially be
overturned after Step Two. If they were determined to have
constitutional protections, the analysis should stop. However, this test
would also allow Congress to retain its autonomy and utilize military
commissions for the trial of enemy belligerents.
VI. CONCLUSION
If it did nothing else, the Bahlul per curiam showed the contentious
nature of the issue of the military commissions. If we limit ourselves to
the concurrences and the dissent in the Bahlul per curiam, the options
appear relatively bleak.
The truth of the matter is that military commissions have been used
since the Civil War and the chances that Congress will move away from
their use is slim at best. There is a chance that Bahlul will be heard by
the Supreme Court in the next year. Should it be heard by the Supreme
Court, we can only hope that the remaining questions about the Define
and Punish Clause, the constraints of international law, and the true
174. Ali Hamza Ahmed Suliman Al Bahlul (“Bahlul III”) v. United States 840 F.3d 757, 777
(D.C. Cir. 2016).
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meaning of Quirin will finally be decided.
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